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Abstract
International comparisons of labour market institutions and their transfer across
boundaries have gained in importance. The paper deals with the question of the
best way to proceed in making such comparisons. At the same time the question
of the possibilities and limits to institutional transfer is addressed. On the one
hand competition between systems obliges governments to adopt institutions of
other countries. On the other hand inflexibilities resulting from path dependency
and/or powerful domestic interest groups can impede the transfer of institutions.








International Comparisons and Transfer of Labour Market
Institutions
1.  Introduction
Political decision makers hope that international comparisons of institutions will give
them insights that will help to improve decision making in their own country. They wish
to know what institutional arrangements have been chosen by other countries and
whether the arrangements chosen have given desirable results. Under certain
circumstances they would then transfer such arrangements to their own country. In this
context the question arises of the best way to proceed in making such comparisons; at
the same time the question of the possibilities of and limits to institutional transfer
should be addressed.
The following contribution deals with these two questions. Sections 2 and 3 explain
why international comparisons of institutions have gained in importance in the last 20
years and what objectives are pursued in these comparisons. In the following section (4)
the reasons why countries introduce institutional arrangements are examined and, in
section 5, the question is discussed, how one can take into account these arrangements.
This analysis is carried forward in section 6 which shows how arrangements leading to
desirable results can be identified. In this connection, aggregated analysis of effects as
well as microeconomic evaluation is employed (sections 7 and 8). One must not lose
sight of the fact that comparisons of institutions are not made for their own sake, but are
a preliminary step toward the international transfer of appropriate institutions.  Section 9
deals with the question, to what extent competition between systems obliges
governments to adapt institutions from other countries. Finally, sections 10 and 11
contain a discussion of the question, to what extent path dependent inflexibilities and/or
powerful domestic interest groups can impede the transfer of institutions. Labour
market institutions are at the centre of this discussion.
2.  International Comparison of Institutions: A Modern Basis for Political
Decisions
The way an economy works is determined decisively by its institutions. Institutions
regulate social life. They impose limits to individual comportment and steer it into
certain channels. They contribute to the stabilisation of expectations. Among the
institutions one finds the market, the laws of the state, government regulations, and
court decisions, agreements between interest groups, as well as norms, customs, and
value judgements shared by the members of society (Regini 2000, p. 22). The following
remarks focus on regulations emanating from the state (e.g. legal dispositions regulating2
the termination of employment) and on agreements between interest groups (e.g. wage
agreements between employers and trade unions).
Laying down institutional arrangements has always been a primordial responsibility of
the state. In fulfilling this responsibility, governments have always had in mind the
arrangements prevailing in other countries. Since the beginning of the 1980s, however,
so-called benchmarking has gained considerably in importance. In view of the
“eurosclerosis” that has been diagnosed a debate has begun on the advantages and
disadvantages of Europe as a place to live or work or conduct a business. In this debate,
great attention has been given to differences with respect to state regulation between
European states, and especially as compared to the United States. Margaret Thatcher
began in Great Britain a comprehensive process of deregulation which resulted inter
alia in the flexibilisation of the labour market. Later, Tony Blair adapted the American
welfare to work approach. Similar benchmarking processes can be observed in other
areas in almost all EU countries (Tronti 1998). And in transformation economies, as
well, governments have been eager to adapt institutional set-ups of western countries
that seem to promise success. In carrying out benchmarking studies, international
organisations such as the OECD, the Commission of the EU and the International
Labour Office (ILO) support individual countries in their efforts to carry out
international comparisons and to identify best practices.
The increasing importance of international comparisons of institutions in recent years is
due to a number of factors. As a result of globalisation, locational competition is
becoming more intense. State regulations are becoming increasingly more important as
a locational factor for enterprises that operate internationally. Governments are thus
competing against each other in the attempt to develop an institutional framework that is
as attractive as possible. The growth of international integration means that increasingly
‘national’ economies are subject to similar shocks. This provides a better basis for
evaluating the ability of national institutional arrangements to cope with such shocks.
Institutional learning, which is facilitated by improvements in communications, is
developing into an important foundation for political decisions ( Dolowitz and Marsh
2000).
Another reason for the increasing importance of international comparisons of
institutions is to be seen in the on-going dissolution of the original ideological
foundations of the modern welfare state. This means that the traditional sources of
legitimation for the state’s economic policies are increasingly called into question. On
the other hand, established ideological positions are less and less a hindrance to
adapting other countries’ ideas and institutional arrangements. A pragmatic attitude is
becoming more and more common. Politicians look increasingly to those states which
have the status of a role model. Other countries’ successful institutional arrangements
serve to legitimise institutional change in one’s own country (Cox 1999; Strassheim
2001).3
3.  Objectives of an International Comparison of Institutions
The international comparison of institutions forms an important part of political
benchmarking. With respect to labour market policy questions, it is directed at
determining which institutional arrangements have been the basis for success in the
labour market and which have proven to be counter-productive. Although this task
appears at first glance to be simple, it is, in fact, very complex (Schütz et al. 1998).
Learning from other countries involves finding out what shape other countries have
given to their institutional arrangements. It is also of interest to know to what extent the
institutional arrangements find practical application, or whether they exist mainly on
paper. The institutional learning is also directed at organisations which are concerned
with the adaptation and implementation of institutions. But institutional learning ought
not to be content with merely taking stock. In many cases it will prove important to
ascertain as well the reasons and the immediate cause for the introduction of specific
institutional arrangements. Only when this is known will it be possible to determine
whether the motives for the foreign arrangement are analogous to the problems at home
for which one seeks a solution. The degree of congruence in the objectives pursued
casts light on the question whether the regulatory model will be of use in attaining a
given goal (Bamber and Lansbury 1998, p. 2).
Of course, learning from other countries should not be confined to the consideration of
the nature of institutional arrangements, but must also include the consideration of their
effectiveness. This requires a process of evaluation. This must be done on the basis of
appropriate indicators of performance. Furthermore, in carrying out the evaluation, the
possibility that complementary relationships with other institutional arrangements may
exist must be taken into account. And finally, one must take into consideration the
nature of the shocks to which the country examined was exposed during the period
under review.
The relationship between institutional arrangements and certain indicators of
performance can not only be determined for individual countries in isolation, but can
also be based on studies that go beyond one country. These relate performance as
measured by certain indicators to differences in the regulatory approach of the countries
being studied. In some cases, changes in the system of regulation over time are taken
into account (Boeri et al. 2000).
4.  Reasons Why Institutional Arrangements Are Introduced
In carrying out an international comparison, it is useful to know of the reasons that have
lead to the introduction of new institutional arrangements, or to the modification of
existing arrangements. Three categories of causes may be identified. First, state
institutions are created in order to reduce inefficiencies resulting from market failure. (It
goes without saying that action by the state is only called for if one can exclude the4
possibility that the state’s intervention will give rise to new and even more serious
inefficiencies.) Second, institutional arrangements are initiated in order to correct the
distribution solution found by the market. And finally, interest groups attempt to
influence the institutional framework in pursuance of their own advantage.
Market failure can arise owing to monopoly power, to external effects or to
asymmetrical information. If it is an employer who is exercising monopoly power (e.g.
if a certain enterprise is by far the largest employer in a region), then when profits are at
a maximum, the wage rate will lie under the marginal product of labour. The level of
employment will be lower than it should be and could be raised by fixing a minimum
wage higher than the prevailing wage (and as close as possible to the equilibrium wage)
(Stigler 1946). If it is the employees who are exercising monopoly power, then an
improvement in efficiency could be attained by permitting exceptions in the wage
agreement.
In the case of external effects, misleading incentives can be avoided by setting up
institutional arrangements resulting in the external effects being internalised. If for
example vocational training and qualification measures are not carried out by
enterprises because they find that they can obtain all the labour they require by
recruiting employees from other firms, then imposing a penalty for non-compliance
with vocational training requirements can provide partial compensation for this
externality (Addison and Siebert 1999, p. 43ff.).
A further cause of market failure can lie in the enterprise’s ignorance of the
characteristics of its employees or of those applying for a job. As a result, an individual
enterprise might, for example, be reluctant to offer its employees maternity leave, since
it sees the risk that among its women applicants for jobs there might be an above
average proportion of pregnant women, which it would have no way of identifying
before hiring. Owing to the risk of adverse selection, employees will therefore not be
willing to offer maternity leave. Only when the state obliges all employers to grant
maternity leave, does the problem of adverse selection resolve itself and the desired
establishment of maternal leave can take place (Blau and Kahn 1999, p. 1405; Addison
and Siebert 1999, p. 46 ff.).
Besides regulations which aim at increasing efficiency, institutions are created in order
to correct the distribution brought about by the market and to increase income security.
Central wage negotiations are often introduced with a view toward reducing wage
disparities. Social security systems have among other things the goal of guaranteeing a
secure income in cases of need (Agell 2000).
Institutional arrangements are not, however, always directed at improving the economic
welfare of the general public by means of improvements in efficiency or in income
distribution. Often enough, the motive force behind such arrangements are powerful
interest groups, which are keen on obtaining their own advantages. Either they have the
authority, together with other interest groups, to define the arrangements in certain
areas. Or they make use of their influence to ensure that the state, in its laws or
administrative edicts, take into account its interests. The provisions protecting5
jobholders against unjust dismissal offer an example of an institutional arrangement that
is driven by these kinds of interests. This protection works to the advantage of the
‘insiders’ (the employed), at the cost of the ‘outsiders’ (the unemployed). Thus the job
security enjoyed by the insiders is enhanced, which permits them to push through higher
wage demands without the risk of losing their employment. The larger the group of
insiders is, the easier it is for them to protect their interests (Saint-Paul 2000).
5.  Capturing the Institutional Arrangements of Other Countries
The first step in carrying out an international comparison of institutions is to choose the
countries with which the institutions of a particular country are to be compared.  A
country’s institutional networks are influenced by the political environment
(dictatorship, democracy), by the economic system (planned, market economy), by the
stage of development in which the country finds itself (developing, threshold,
industrialised economy), by the prevailing culture of regulation (formal vs. informal
regulation) of the country, to name only the most important influences. Institutional
learning is as a rule only possible, when the countries used for comparison exhibit
similar characteristics. For this reason, highly developed market economies should be
compared with each other. Moreover, it should be taken into account that within this
larger group there are sub-groups of countries whose institutional networks show
common characteristics differing in some respects from those of the larger group (cf.
Esping-Andersen 1996).
The next question is, what institutions should be compared. In connection with labour
market questions, a large number of institutional arrangements are relevant. Institutions
bearing on the labour market include the framework for wage negotiations, legal
protection against unjustified dismissal, conditions of work, vocational training and
qualification, working hours, the mobility of labour, job matching process, early
retirement, social protection of unemployed persons etc. Which arrangements should be
compared with which other arrangements depends, of course, on the question under
discussion and on the empirically determined relevance for that question of the
institutions under review.
In order to carry out a comparison between countries it is often necessary to make the
arrangements in the different countries comparable. This may require converting
qualitative information into quantitative; it may require aggregating individual
indicators into a comprehensive indicator. Weighting schemes based on cluster or on
factor analysis can be helpful in this connection ( Nicoletti et al. 1999). A concrete
example for this kind of procedure is the compression of 22 individual indicators into
one comprehensive indicator representing the effectiveness of the measures of
protection against dismissal in individual countries (OECD 1999, p. 49ff.).
Comparisons limited to a point in time are often not sufficient to capture the difference
between institutional arrangements. As a rule, such arrangements are initially introduced
or later modified in the course of reform processes extending over longer periods of
time. Furthermore, institutions only bring about behavioural changes and processes of6
adaptation affecting the real economy when they have been applied over a certain
period of time. Therefore it is necessary to compare institutions in their development
over time. But time series appropriate to this task are not always available.
One problem in carrying out international comparisons of institutions is that the texts of
laws and edicts do not tell us whether they are actually applied or not. One country’s
strict rules may be paired with lax enforcement, whilst another country’s lax provisions
may be applied with great rigour. Simply comparing the text of the law would, in such
cases, give a misleading picture. Let us take the application of sanctions for refusal of
work by unemployed persons as an example. Out of the 12 OECD countries which
provide for sanctions, Switzerland, Finland and Norway apply them relatively strictly;
Japan, New Zealand, Belgium and Germany, on the other hand, apply them hardly at all
(OECD 2000, p. 136). This example shows that evaluating the institutional arrangement
without knowledge of its application is not satisfactory. But the information required for
a well-founded evaluation is often not available.
International comparisons of institutions should not be limited to laws and
administrative orders. The establishment of norms as well as the interpretation of legal
or administrative provisions by the courts are in many cases of significance (Ichino et
al. 2001). At the same time, attention must be paid to informal norms and customs,
which are particularly important in lightly regulated countries. In the USA, for example,
a high degree of external labour market flexibility resulting from scant protection
against dismissal stands in contrast to a low degree of flexibility within the enterprise
(Regini 2000, p. 23).
6.  Evaluation of Institutional Arrangements
The international comparison of institutions should not stop at the mere collection of
other countries’ institutional arrangements, but should proceed to the identification of
those arrangements which have brought about desirable results in the labour market.
Those institutions that can contribute to the solution of specific problems in the
researcher’s own country have a claim to his special interest. The identification of
appropriate institutional arrangements requires as a prior condition their evaluation.
This procedure must be carried out in several steps: the objectives must be defined as a
basis for measuring the effectiveness of the institutions; the intensity of compliance
must be examined; the effectiveness of the arrangement must be estimated and a
comprehensive cost-benefit analysis must be carried out (Schmid et al. 1996, p. 5).
Labour market institutions are created in order to attain certain results by means of
modifications in the behaviour or in the expectations of the participants in the labour
market. Correspondingly, the immediate objective can be to influence a certain
behavioural or expectational aspect, e.g. the search activity of unemployed persons, the
avoidance of free rider activities, or other behaviour (Teuling and Hartog 1998, p. 110
f.; Schmid and Schömann 1994, p. 50 f.). On the other hand, the goal pursued can refer
to certain labour market results such as the position of the  Beveridge curve, the
equilibrium volume of unemployment, or real wage developments. From the objectives,7
performance indicators can be derived which can serve as a basis for assessing the
institutional arrangements. Defining the objectives influences the evaluation results.
Thus, empirical studies show that a high degree of protection against dismissal is an
obstacle to reducing long-term unemployment; it is not clear, however, that such
protection contributes to a higher rate of unemployment in general (Boeri et al. 2000,
section 1.1.2).
The second step in evaluation refers to the implementation of the institutional
arrangement. Arrangements which only exist on paper have scant effect. In order for
them to have effect, they must be applied to the persons specified and the application
must be long-term. In some cases, compliance must be enforced by means of sanctions.
Implementation includes not only the concrete application, but also its harmonisation
with complementary institutions and with discretionary economic policy measures; the
behaviour of relevant actors must also be coordinated. As has been mentioned, the
implementation of institutional arrangements is seldom documented. This is another
obstacle to international comparisons of institutions (on the lack of information on the
application of protection against dismissal in OECD countries, cf. Bertola et al. 1999).
The estimation of the effectiveness of institutional arrangements is affected by
theoretical considerations. For quite a long time the neoclassical theory of the labour
market was dominant and since it offered no room for the role of institutions, little or no
attention was paid to their role in the labour market; in the last 15 to 20 years, however,
such institutions have become increasingly an object of theoretical and empirical
interest. Although a self-contained theoretical construction is still not available, there
are a number of individual models which take institutional aspects into account (Blau
and Kahn 1999; Nickell and Layard 1999).
The effects emanating from labour market institutions are complex. One reason for this
is that there are influences coming from other determinants of economic activity such as
the regulation of markets for goods, the financial incentives set by the state, the
composition of the participants in the labour market, and their behavioural patterns.
Then too, it must be borne in mind that the effects observed are quite possibly not pure
effects, but only take place in connection with certain kinds of shocks (Blanchard 1998).
Different methods may be used to determine the effectiveness of labour market
institutions:
•  Aggregate analyses of effectiveness measure the influence of labour market
institutions on certain macroeconomic indicators which are defined as the
performance criteria. Example could be employment rates, unemployment rates,
exits from unemployment, or the level of wages. Such analyses of effectiveness
are carried out at the regional or national level. An advantage of this approach is
that such indicators take into account both direct and indirect effects. A
disadvantage is that although effective institutions can be identified, very little
light is shed on the details of the most desirable institutional arrangement
(Hagen and Steiner 2000, p. 75ff.).8
•  The last mentioned disadvantage is less likely to attend microeconomic
evaluation studies. Here the researcher attempts to estimate the effect of
institutional arrangements on the market participant directly affected by means
of individual data. The actual situation is compared to a counterfactual situation
in which it is supposed that he or she were not affected. Of course, the same
person cannot be at once affected and not affected. It is therefore necessary to
form a control group, which ideally should differ from the group of persons
affected only in one respect: the institutional arrangement under review does not
affect them (Schmidt et al. 2001, p. 28ff.). Social experiments of this kind have
been up till now carried out above all in North America, but not in Germany. In
the framework of Canada’s “Self-Sufficiency Project”, which examined the
programmes of reinsertion in employment among long term unemployed single
parents in the provinces of British Columbia and New Brunswick, 6000 single
parents were chosen at random, and divided into two groups, one half being
assigned to the programme group, the other half to the control group ( Ochel
2002, p. 135). The evaluation was based on a comparison between the results
obtained in the two groups. Microeconomic evaluation can also be based on data
not obtained from experiments. This approach seeks to replace the missing
control group with econometric and statistical procedures (Heckmann et al.
1999).
•  Microeconomic evaluations capture the direct, but not the indirect effects. The
indirect effects arise as a result of substitution and displacement effects. An
example of a substitution effect would be the case of an employer responding to
a change in relative wages by replacing his employees with previously
unemployed persons, for whom the rules regarding the conditions on which they
are obliged to accept employment have been tightened. It is possible to attempt
to capture such substitution effects by surveying the employers, the employees
and the unemployed persons concerned.
Analyses of effectiveness only provide information about the effects of institutional
arrangements. The effects obtained must, however, be set in relation to the cost they
entail. If all direct and indirect effects and costs have been taken into account, then in
effect a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis has been carried out, which would form a
basis for economic policy decisions.
7.  Analytical Comparisons of Aggregate Effects in an International Context
If the institution under review shows no variation over time, then the meaningfulness of
aggregate analysis of effects that refer to one country will be limited. In this case, a
comparative evaluation across international boundaries is a possibility. One will look
for countries in which the institution concerned has experienced changes. Thus it is
possible to capture the effects of changes in trade union density by comparing the USA
with Canada. In the USA the degree of organisation has been declining since the middle
of the 1970s, whilst in Canada it has remained approximately constant. Then again, it
may be useful to compare countries in which the institution of interest has always had a9
different weight or relative importance. Thus the effects of a greater coverage of wage
agreements in Germany can be evaluated by means of comparisons with Denmark,
Norway or Canada, where the coverage is more restricted.
Alongside comparisons between pairs of countries, multiple comparisons have gained in
importance. Here, the effects of one or more institutional arrangements in different
countries are analysed. Such studies may be based on cross section analysis, i.e. the
differences in the institutional arrangements at a given time are compared with respect
to their effects. Or the cross sectional data are combined with time series, in order to
observe the changes in the institutional arrangements in the course of time.
Analyses of aggregate effects of institutional arrangements based on panel data, i.e. on
cross section data combined with time series data have gained in importance throughout
the 1990s. With this approach one has sought an answer to the question why
unemployment in Europe has been increasing since the 1970s, whilst it has been
receding in the USA. In this connection, the extent to which institutions are responsible
for this cleavage has been examined. If institutional arrangements in Europe are
detrimental to employment, US American arrangements on the other hand are shown to
be favourable, then this would offer at least a partial explanation for the observed
phenomenon.
Explaining the increase in unemployment in Europe exclusively with institutional
changes has been challenged with the counter argument that many labour market
institutions have remained unchanged since the 1960s. Hence, it is argued, institutional
differences might explain at the most the difference in the magnitude of unemployment
at a given time, but not the changes over time. In order to explain the differences in the
development of unemployment in Europe and the USA, one ought not to study changes
in institutions, but rather the ability of institutions to deal with macroeconomic shocks
should be the principal focus. American institutions, it is maintained, are better able set
in motion processes of adaptation to demand, productivity, wage and interest rate
shocks than European regulatory approaches (Blanchard and Wolfers 2000, p. C2).
Analytical comparisons of aggregate effects in an international context have up till the
present been carried out primarily by OECD staff (Scarpetta 1996; Elmeskov et al. 1998
and others) as well as by university researchers. A representative picture of the available
panel analyses relating to the labour market provide:  Layard et al. 1991, especially
chapter 9; Blanchard and Wolfers 2000; Fitoussi et al. 2000; Belot and van Ours 2000;
Nickell and Layard 1999; and Nickell et al. 2001. All studies take into consideration
both institutions and shocks as determinants of unemployment, but proceed on different
concepts of the functional interrelationships. For Layard, Blanchard and Fitoussi, either
shocks or long-term changes in real economic variables are the basic causes of
unemployment. The extent and the duration of the effects resulting from shocks are
influenced by institutional differences in the different countries. Belot and Nickell, on
the other hand, see changes in institutional arrangements as being primarily responsible
for the increase in unemployment in Europe. Whilst Belot takes into account interaction
between the institutions, Nickell excludes very largely this aspect.10
In the following paragraphs the results of the analyses of Blanchard and Wolfers (2000)
and of Nickell and Layard (1999) are presented briefly. Blanchard and Wolfers examine
the increase in unemployment in Europe since the 1960s, which, however, developed
differently in the individual countries. The authors come to the conclusion that long-
term changes in total factor productivity, the real rate of interest and the demand for
labour (as a result of the relative increase in the dearness of labour) explain the increase
in average unemployment, but not the national differences. The differences observed
between countries are rather due to the differences in the development of national
labour market institutions. Only when the interaction between shocks and labour market
institutions is taken into account, is it possible to explain the pattern of European
unemployment.
Nickell and Layard (1999) examine the effects that changes in labour market institutions
have on short-term, on long-term and on total unemployment (and on labour force
participation). Besides the burden of taxes on wage and salary income, and the
proportion of home owners (considered as a barrier to mobility). they also take into
account the following institutional factors: protection against unjustified dismissal; trade
union density; coverage of collective wage agreements; coordination of wage
negotiations; extent to which unemployment benefits replace wages; duration of such
benefits; active labour market policies. The study examines 20 OECD countries for two
periods, viz. the average of 1983 – 88, and 1989 – 94. The authors conclude that the
increase in unemployment was mainly due to the following factors:
•  an increase in the burden of taxation of wage and salary income;
•  high union density and high coverage of wage agreements; a coordination of
wage negotiations between trade unions and employers associations (in some
instances with the support of the state) can, however, considerably weaken the
undesirable effect on unemployment;
•  high and increasing replacement rate in case of unemployment, and especially a
long duration of benefits.
Active labour market policy tends to reduce unemployment. Rigorous protection against
dismissal increases long-term unemployment, reduces at the same time short-term
unemployment and has practically no effect on overall unemployment.11








Total Tax Wedge (%) 0.027 (4.0) 0.023 (1.6) 0.028 (3.5)
Employment Protection (1 – 20) 0.052 (1.4) -0.061 (2.8)
Union Density (%) 0.010 (2.3) 0.010 (1.0) 0.0031 (0.5)
Union Coverage Index (1 – 3) 0.38 (2.7) 0.83 (2.3) 0.45 (2.1)
Coordination (Union + Employer)
(2 – 6)
-0.43 (6.1) -0.54 (3.6) -0.34 (3.8)
Replacement Rate (%) 0.013 (3.4) 0.011 (1.3) 0.013 (2.6)
Benefit Duration (years) 0.10 (2.2) 0.25 (2.7) 0.045 (0.8)
Active Labour Market Policies -0.023 (3.3) -0.039 (2.8) -0.097 (1.2)
Owner Occupation Rate (%) 0.013 (2.6) -0.0007 (0.1) 0.01 (2.7)
Change in Inflation (% pts. p.a.) -0.21 (2.2) -0.30 (1.6) -0.29 (2.7)
Dummy for 1989 – 1994 0.15 (1.5) 0.30  (1.8) 0.092 (1.0)
R
2 0.82 0.84 0.73
N [countries. periods] 40 [20.2] 38 [19.2] 38 [19.2]
a Results of regression analysis, t-statistics in rounded parentheses.
Source: Nickell. S. J. and R. Layard (1999), p. 3053.
Analytical comparisons of aggregate effects in an international context make an
important contribution to the explanation of unemployment (as well as to explaining the
evolution of other macroeconomic indicators). They identify the institutional
arrangements (or to be more precise: the changes in institutional arrangements) which
bring about an increase, and those which bring about a decrease in unemployment. Such
studies capture the overall effect of regulations; they cannot, however, separate out the
direct and indirect effects. Long-term analyses of effects that examine periods extending
over several decades make it possible to abstract from short-term institutional
variations.
Analyses of aggregate effects have, however, their limitations. Quite aside from the
difficulties involved in dealing with certain methodological problems such as
endogenous effects or interdependence between institutions, such analyses are
accompanied by loss of information. Peculiarities of individual countries are lost sight
of, specific regional contexts are passed over. The details of institutional arrangements
in the individual countries are for the most part ignored. Such analyses do not take into
account the degree to which regulations are applied or the conditions of their12
implementation. Above and beyond the loss of information, these analyses do not
always show what motivated the measures taken to obtain the effects, nor do they deal
with the role that market participants’ expectations play in connection with the
efficiency of institutions. And finally, analyses of aggregate effects do not allow
conclusions about the attainment of the objectives of specific groups (Boeri et al. 2000,
Section 5; Hagen and Steiner 2000; Schmid 2001, p. 106f.).
Analyses of aggregate effects provide valuable indications on how to change labour
market institutions in order to attain certain objectives. But they are insufficient as a
basis for formulating concrete reform measures. They must be complemented by
microeconomic evaluation studies. These studies must take cognisance of the way
certain institutional arrangements are designed and applied in the countries being
compared and they must make this a part of the assessment. Furthermore, the question
of transferring institutional arrangements from one country to another must be
considered.
8.  Microeconomic Evaluation Which Takes into Account Complementarities
Whilst analyses of aggregate effects must up to a certain point abstract from the
peculiarities of institutional arrangements, microeconomic evaluation can focus on the
characteristics of individual regulatory arrangements. Such evaluation attempts to
capture the historical origins of an institution, the specific form it has taken and the way
it is applied. Moreover, the environment in which the arrangement operates must be
taken into account. In order to comply with these requirements, microeconomic
analyses are primarily carried out for regions of countries or countries.
At the core of a microeconomic evaluation lies the assessment of the effects which the
institutional arrangement has on those directly affected. The effects are measured on the
basis of individual data. A typical object of such an evaluation is for example the
connection between sharpening the eligibility requirements for receiving unemployment
benefits on the one hand, and the number of departures from and accessions to the
population of recipients on the other. For example, this relationship can be examined
based on Danish experience, where changes in the system were undertaken. Since 1996,
young people under 25 who have not completed professional or vocational training and
who in the preceding nine months have been unemployed for at least six, are offered an
18 month training opportunity. Rejecting this offer entails the loss of unemployment
benefits. The benefits paid during the duration of the training are clearly lower than the
unemployment benefits. In this way, one hopes to create an incentive to take up regular
professional or vocational training, or to take up a job, before the training programme is
finished. In addition, one hopes to limit participation to those young people who do not
have the possibility to participate in regular training. The experience has been that once
this training programme was started, there was an increase in departures from the group
of unemployed young people in favour of participation in regular professional or
vocational training. Furthermore, after the training programme had been in operation for
approximately three months, the number of unemployed young people renouncing their
entitlements increased sharply. It is clear that the sanctions imposed on persons who13
refuse their participation, which entailed the loss of their entitlement to unemployment
benefits, were having an effect (Jensen et al. 1999).
In evaluating the effects of changes in a system of regulation certain methodological
requirements have to be complied with. This can be illustrated with the Danish study
just mentioned. The system of sanctions applied to unemployed young people cannot be
adequately evaluated by only examining the behaviour of this group of young people. It
is possible that they would have sought regular professional or vocational training, or
would have taken up employment, without any sanctions being imposed. Hence it is
necessary to compare the behaviour of unemployed young people subject to these
sanctions to the behaviour of unemployed young people not subject to these penalties.
At the same time, the groups being compared should be as similar as possible with
respect to all characteristics bearing on the success of the measure taken, in order to
avoid a selective bias (Hagen and Steiner 2000, p. 44 ff.; Schmidt 2000).
But observations made at the microeconomic level do not permit conclusions about
effects at the macroeconomic level. This is due to the presence of indirect affects
(substitution and displacement effects) which cannot be captured by a purely
microeconomic evaluation. Thus, to continue with the Danish example, rigorous
sanctions may lead to unemployed young people accepting low paid jobs. Employers
might take advantage of this situation in order to replace some of their employees with
formerly unemployed persons (substitution affect). If this is the case, then the
macroeconomic effect on employment will be overstated, since only regular
employment obtained by those who were previously unemployed is taken into account,
whilst the loss of jobs by those who were previously employed is neglected. The
indirect effects can be quantified approximately by carrying out surveys among
employees and employers. Such surveys are a useful supplement to microeconomic
evaluations.
The isolated evaluation of an individual institutional arrangement provides information
of only limited value, since it does not take into account the complementary
relationships between this intervention in the labour market and other regulations.
Complementarities are to be found wherever the effects of one particular institutional
arrangement depend on the simultaneous application of other arrangements (Orszag and
Snower 1999, p. 3). Interrelationships between institutional arrangements are frequent.
Thus protection against unjustified dismissal will have the effect that employers will be
reluctant to hire new employees; and this reluctance will be all the greater, the more
unemployed persons limit their search activity owing to generous unemployment
benefits. The effects of protection against dismissal also depend on the way wages are
determined. To the extent that employed persons (“Insiders”) have bargaining power in
wage negotiations, and to the extent that their bargaining position is further
strengthened by protection against the loss of their jobs, then wage and salary increases
will be greater, with the result that there will be fewer hirings. If, on the other hand,
wages and salaries are determined in a framework in which neither side has significant
bargaining power, then it is conceivable that the costs of rigorous protection against
dismissal are compensated for by the lower wage and salary level, with the result that14
the hiring behaviour of employers is not much affected (Coe and  Snower 1996;
Eichhorst et al. 2001, p. 166).
The presence of complementarities between the different attempts to regulate the labour
market and the market for goods on the one hand, and between the regulatory measures
and other discretionary measures of economic policy, on the other, has far-reaching
consequences for the formulation of employment policy. Partial reforms of the
institutional arrangements which do not take into account these complementary
relationships often have only slight success. A comprehensive employment policy
approach which takes into consideration the complementarities between institutional
arrangements and other measures and which therefore mobilises more resources is
likely to be more successful (Orszag and Snower 1999, p. 22). But on the other hand,
such a comprehensive approach presents more imponderabilities than a partial approach
and is more likely to meet with the opposition of interest groups (cf. section 11).
The comparative evaluation of microeconomic country studies provides insights into the
institutional arrangements and measures with which employment effects can be attained
in the most effective way. Comparative evaluations across international boundaries have
been carried out for example by the Bertelsmann Foundation in the context of its
international reform monitor programme;  these studies have focussed on social
policies, labour market policies and wage and salary policy. Hagen and Steiner (2000),
Martin (2000), Schmid (2001), and Schmidt et al. (2001) have published studies in this
area as well.  In addition, such comparative studies provide insights on the optimal
design of individual institutional arrangements as expressed in the concept of “Best
practices”.
9.  International Transfer of Institutions Under Conditions of Competition
Between Systems
Institutional learning is one of the most important conditions for institutional transfer
between countries. In the case of state regulatory activities, the only way such a transfer
could occur would be through the conscious decision by the government to adapt
another country’s arrangements. The decision will depend to a great degree on whether
the government concerned is that of a country enjoying a considerable measure of
autonomy, or that of a country subject to system competition.
The government of a country enjoying a high degree of autonomy in its decisions will
as a rational actor give precedence to the wishes of its citizens. If an increase in
employment is high on their scale of priorities, then the government will decide on
measures tending to increase employment. If, on the other hand, the citizens attach more
importance to distributional goals, then the decisions will tend to favour arrangements
for redistribution. The preference for a given objective does not mean that a particular
foreign institutional arrangement must be adapted. This would only be the case if with
respect to this objective there were a clearly superior institutional set-up. But there is no
evidence for this. On the one hand there is the “one best way” thesis, on the other hand,
the thesis of the functional equivalence of institutional networks. In this view, a given15
economic policy objective can be equally well attained within different institutional
systems. In support of the thesis of functional equivalence it is pointed out that in both a
welfare state such as Sweden and a liberal economic system such the United States of
America it is possible to attain nearly full employment. The success of the Netherlands’
“polder model” also supports the functional equivalence thesis, although in all cases the
sustainability of the success attained must be subject to scrutiny.
In contrast to an economy which is for the most part closed, governments of open
economies which are subject to system competition must take into account not only the
preferences of their citizens, but also the effects of their policies on the locational
decisions of the mobile factors of production. Owing to increased mobility, enterprises
and labour can change their location more easily than in the past. This is particularly
true of enterprises, and governments have to be particularly solicitous of their interests.
Since almost all governments have to consider the effects of their decisions on the
behaviour of the mobile factors of production, they are all subject to international
locational competition.
This competition to be an attractive location for economic activity affects many areas of
government policy, including that area bearing on the legal and institutional framework
of the labour market. This framework comprehends the system of wage and salary
determination, the system of social security, the system of education and vocational
training, the institutional system of private households (Schütz et al. 1998, p.16). The
content of arrangements and the way they are applied are important influences in the
locational decisions of enterprises and the mobility decisions of employees. It is not
always clear whether changes in the institutional arrangements affect enterprises’
locational decisions favourably or unfavourably. For example, cuts in the system of
social security may on the one hand provide relief from taxes and social security
contributions for enterprises, but on the other hand, social harmony may be endangered,
and productivity may as a result suffer. In the same way, limitations on the protection
against dismissal enjoyed by employees may increase the flexibility of employers in
their personnel decisions, but it may also discourage employees from developing human
capital specific to the enterprise where they work ( Sachverständigenrat (Council of
Economic Experts) 1997, Paragraph 306 ff.).
In view of the international competition between systems the question arises whether
existing differences between countries will endure, or whether individual countries will
be forced to adapt their own system of institutions to the most efficient model. If this
last alternative prevails, then a process of convergence of institutional systems will be
observed. Although it is clearly the case that the competition between systems obliges
countries to adapt their network of institutions to continually changing exigencies, in
order to avoid falling behind in the competition for locational advantage, nonetheless
there are a number of reasons to believe that a convergence of institutional systems will
not come about.
For one thing, the competition for locational advantage does not affect all areas of the
economy. Whilst large parts of manufacturing industry are subject to international
competition, this is not true to the same extent for the service sectors of the economy.16
At the same time, not all factors of production show the same degree of mobility, so that
the exit option is not equally available to all.
Moreover, the theory of comparative institutional advantage provides arguments in
favour of a multiplicity of institutional systems. If the international division of labour
leads individual countries to specialise in certain products, then this will be associated
with the simultaneous specialisation in certain institutional networks. The deregulated
labour markets and dynamic markets for venture capital that are characteristic of the
USA, for example, provide advantages for enterprises that are engaged in radical
innovations such as the development of entirely novel products or new production
processes. In order to carry out such innovations successfully it is necessary that one
should be able to hire and sack employees quickly, establish new enterprises easily etc.
Under such circumstances enterprises in sectors such as biotechnology, software
development, microelectronic, and entertainment find an environment in which they can
prosper. In Germany, on the other hand, labour law has evolved offering job security,
on the job training, industrial democracy etc. The German system of corporate
governance provides enterprise with a long-term planning horizon. These institutional
arrangements are favourable to incremental innovation in the form of continual
improvements in products and in processes in small steps. These kinds of innovations
provide competitive advantages to producers of machines, motor vehicles, durable
consumers goods etc. (Hall and Soskice 2001).
The convergence of institutional arrangements as a result of system competition would
mean that the government would, as a rule, be responding to the needs for reform
articulated by enterprises. If the political decision making process is oriented to other
interests such as those expressed by voters, or if it is autonomous, then convergence is
less likely to occur.
And finally, it should be pointed out that there is little empirical evidence for the
convergence thesis. The network of labour market institutions in highly developed
industrialised countries shows quite considerable differences, as can be seen if one
compares the system of wage negotiations in continental European countries with those
in the Anglo-Saxon countries. The divergences have, indeed, rather increased. Whilst
the continental European countries during the last 40 years have scarcely deregulated
their systems of wage negotiations, the Anglo-Saxon countries have pushed forward
their efforts to liberalise their systems ( Nickell et al. 2002;  Traxler et al. 2001). In
Margaret Thatcher’s Great Britain and in New Zealand, in 1991, best practice models
taken from the United States were introduced as part of a thorough overhaul and reform
of labour market institutions.
Competition between systems results – as has been shown – in the reaction of mobile
production factors being taken into account in addition to the preferences of citizens
when systems of institutions are designed. This competition can be functional in the
sense that it contributes to improvements of the institutional arrangements that have
been introduced with efficiency or distributional objectives (cf. section 4). But it can
also be dysfunctional, i.e. it can lead to arrangements that do not produce the desired
results. This can be illustrated based on the example of the social security system. In an17
open economy in which it is possible to change one’s country of residence, people who
represent a good risk from the standpoint of social policy (i.e. they are unlikely to make
use of welfare entitlements) are likely to move away from the welfare state, whilst
people who represent a poor risk (i.e. the likelihood that they will at some point seek to
take advantage of social protection is high) will try to move to the state offering the
most comprehensive protection. This factor mobility results in financial burdens for the
welfare state. In order to reduce factor migration, the welfare state will lower the burden
of taxes or contributions for the net contributors to the system, and lower the
entitlements for those who are net recipients of benefits. This may be reinforced by the
reactions of other countries and the final result will then be an erosion of the system of
social security. A redistributional policy represented by the setting-up of a system of
social security, which from the point of view of the individual country might be Pareto-
efficient, will be affected to its detriment by such influences, unless countermeasures
are taken (Sinn 1997; Sinn 2002).
10. Path Dependency and Institutional Inflexibility
The competition between systems which is part of the globalisation process has
increased the pressure to reform the institutional arrangements whilst at the same time
taking into account the reactions of mobile factors of production; here it has proved to
be necessary to consider the experiences gained in other countries. In view of this new
challenge, the question arises to what extent national systems of institutions are capable
of being modified? Is it only possible to transfer foreign institutional arrangements
when they are compatible with existing values and with the existing network of
institutions in the target country? Under what conditions will the interaction between
the foreign institutions and the traditional set of rules be seriously disturbed (problem of
institutional coherence)? To what extent will the institutional transfer make excessive
demands on the procedural competence of the recipient country?
In responding to these questions the thesis of the path dependency of institutional
development has gained recognition. The thesis is that institutional change at home is
only influenced to a slight degree, if at all, by the perception of the evolution of foreign
institutions; all attempts to learn from foreign countries, and especially all attempts to
implement what has been learned, can only be successful if carried out in the context of
existing institutions (Scherrer 2001, p. 1). Disturbances of institutional compatibility
give rise to considerable costs, so that path dependency is associated with considerable
institutional inflexibility.
On what notion of path dependency are these ideas based? According to Ackermann
(2001, p. 55) path dependency is present if the process of institutional development has
more than one result, and if the result finally reached depends on the preceding path of
development. A state of institutional development that has been attained tends to be self
reinforcing and hence a considerable measure of institutional inflexibility is the result
(Arthur 1994). It is difficult to adapt institutional arrangements to changed conditions.
Therefore, there is little scope for transferring successful arrangements from foreign
countries.18
The inflexibility of paths of institutional development is due to positive feedbacks.
Following David (1994), Ackermann (2001, chapter 3) distinguishes between three
causes of positive feedbacks in institutions. They refer to the level of actions of
interacting individuals, to the level of rules which structure these interactions, and to the
interrelationship between the levels of actions and rules. On the action level,
coordination effects arise as a result of the advantages offered by standardised patterns
of behaviour. These can lead to stable rules. At the level of rules, complementary effects
will arise, if the interdependent relationships between institutions are of a
complementary nature, i.e. if following a particular rule becomes more attractive as a
result of the interdependence with other rules. Positive feedback as a result of
interactions between the levels of societal rules and the level of individual behaviour,
finally, result in processes of social communication in a society which lead to the
convergence in its members’ mental structures.
In the concept of path dependency, the feed-back effects are responsible for the fact that
the path of institutional development imposes narrow limits on the scope for
institutional modifications. For this reason suboptimal institutions are retained. The
legacy of existing institutions also sets very narrow limits to the possibilities of
institutional transfer across international boundaries. The path of institutional
development is only departed from when the actors consider the loss of efficiency to be
greater than the costs associated with the creation of new and efficient institutions
(North 1992).
A number of objections to the thesis of path dependence and institutional inflexibility
may be formulated. It does not seem very plausible to glimpse in the past development
of institutions only a limiting force, but not at the same time a source of experience
which can be useful in carrying out the reform of institutions. At the same time it is not
at all clear that a path consists only of self-reinforcing sequences and that counter-
reactions are inconceivable. A further central deficiency of the notion of path
dependency is that it is difficult to operationalise. What is the relevant period of time for
the path? Which institutions are decisive for the path? Which events which may have
influenced the path should be taken into consideration (Scherrer 2001)?
Despite these points of criticism, the empirical evidence is not entirely hostile to the
idea of path dependency. The inertial energy with which many west European countries
cling to their labour market institutions seems to be related to the inflexibility predicted
by the thesis of path dependence. However, with respect to labour market institutions in
highly developed economies it is not possible to speak of complete inflexibility. Great
Britain and New Zealand are not the only countries to have carried out successfully
reforms of their labour market institutions; other countries such as the Netherlands and
Denmark have also made such reforms. What is more, the process of institutional
learning has gained in importance in the last decades. And then the question arises
whether the inertia observed in many countries is really due to path dependence, or
whether other factors such as the resistance of powerful interest groups is not
responsible.19
11. The Political Economy of Institutional Transfer
The theory of path dependence refers to spontaneous development processes which are
not the result of contests of power. If such processes only offer a partial explanation for
the inflexibility of institutions and thus for the limits to institutional transfer, then the
question arises whether the power of the state and the influence exerted by interest
groups are not the principal factors hindering the international transfer of institutions?
Relationships of power can play a role in connection with perceiving and selecting
advantageous institutional arrangements, in persuading socially relevant groups at home
that particular arrangements are advantageous, and in introducing and applying such
arrangements.
According to  Scherrer (2001), even the perception of the advantageousness of
institutions is tied to interests. In the national discourse on institutional reform, only
those institutions or arrangements which are deemed compatible with the interests of the
elites and the influential interest groups are admitted to the debate. The ability of central
actors in society to convince others of the advantages of foreign arrangements depends
among other things on whether they succeed in presenting the economic problems under
discussion as being so threatening, that they can only be dealt with successfully by
adapting foreign institutions, which are presented as having coped successfully with the
problem. This ability will be all the greater, the more influence these central actors have
in the process of opinion formation.
If power relationships and competing interests play an important role in determining the
content of the national discourse on foreign institutional models, they play an even more
decisive role in the decisions concerning the introduction and the implementation of
institutional arrangements. Labour market institutions are primarily at the service of
redistributive objectives. If institutional reforms are undertaken with the objective of
improving efficiency, then resistance can be expected from those who expect to lose
out. If the losers constitute power interest groups, then the reforms will be prevented.
Resistance to the adaptation of foreign labour market regulations can have different
causes:
•  The number of losers is larger than the number of winners. Thus, for example,
the liberalisation of the protection against unfair dismissal will mean that for
many insiders the risk of losing their job increases; but the chance of finding
employment will only increase for a relative small number of unemployed
persons.
•  The number of losers resulting from a reform of the labour market may be small,
but the much larger number of winners are scattered among many heterogeneous
groups which aside from labour market issues have different interests, so that
they are unable or unwilling to agree on a common strategy to push through the
reform. In such a case the losers may be successful in their resistance.20
•  There is uncertainty about the effects of the reform. A large number of those that
will be affected are risk adverse and unable to form an opinion whether they will
in the end be among the losers; they therefore argue in favour of retaining the
status quo.
•  To the extent that the reform brings about improvements in efficiency,
compensatory payments may make winners out of potential losers. But the
potential losers are afraid that the compensation will not be high enough, or will
be reduced in future, and therefore withhold their approval (Alogoskoufis et al.
1995, chap. 6; Saint-Paul 2000).
12. Summary
The international comparison of institutions has become more important. It is an
instrument with which the political decision makers in a country seek to learn from
other countries and in this way to improve the quality of decisions taken. The learning
process is not confined simply to finding out what the institutional arrangements of
foreign countries are, but also examines the effectiveness of these arrangements.
Analyses of aggregate effects of institutional arrangements measure the influence of
labour market institutions on certain indicators of success that are defined
macroeconomically. They inform us which arrangements have led internationally to an
increase, and which to a reduction in unemployment. Microeconomic evaluations, on
the other hand, focus on individual regulatory efforts and estimate their effects on those
directly affected. By comparative analysis of microeconomic evaluations, insights into
the best design for individual regulations (best practices) may be obtained.
In adapting institutional arrangements that seem to promise success, national
governments should take into account the complementary relationships existing
between institutional arrangements. Under certain circumstances, comprehensive
institutional reforms may be called for. However, different factors limit the scope for
such reforms. System competition forces governments to take into account the effects of
their decisions on the locational choices of mobile factors of production. Furthermore,
the inflexibility of their own institutional arrangements and values arising from path
dependency makes the adaptation of foreign institutional arrangements more difficult.
And finally, powerful interest groups at home may be opposed to the transfer of
institutions, or may seek to influence the content of such a transfer. The combined
effects of all of these factors, which are different from one country to another, leads to
the multiplicity of institutional systems which characterises today’s international scene
(Freeman 2000).21
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